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Abstract 
The second wave of e-ventures, i.e., newly founded companies offering community-
driven services via the Internet, is characterized by user content contribution, network 
effects, and altering business models due to the dynamic environment. This paper 
investigates issues relevant in the early stages of second wave of e-ventures. The 
paper describes two case studies, one the video sharing community Clipfish, and one 
featuring the online student community Studylounge. It discusses the cases along 
several issues related to the second wave e-venture specific characteristics showing 
specific occurrences in the cases. The paper finds that for e-ventures - as for classic 
ventures - top management involvement, a solid business case, and the illustration of 
the business opportunity foster access to resources. It further discovers that a 
combination of viral, guerilla, and classical marketing instruments fits the context of 
e-ventures and accomplishes community growth.  
 
Keywords: E-Venture, Community, Content 
 
1 Introduction 
Between the mid 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium the first wave of 
entrepreneurship on the Internet produced countless e-ventures, i.e., newly founded 
companies that offer services via the Internet. While many of those e-ventures went 
out of business rather quickly, few remained on the scene and grew successfully. 
Among those surviving and successful players of the first wave e-ventures were eBay 
and Google, both founded in 1995, and Amazon founded in 1996.  
Recently, companies belonging to a second wave of e-ventures, i.e., newly founded 
companies offering community-driven services via the Internet showed common three 
common characteristics, community-driven user content contribution, network effects, 
and altering business models in a dynamic environment (O'Reilly 2005; Stone, Levy 
2006).  
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The second wave of e-ventures according to the business press also goes by the 
striking title 'Web 2.0'. Similar to the first wave, it brings up protagonists such as 
YouTube.com or MySpace.com, both in their first year of operation acquired by other 
Internet or general media companies at high prices.  
The entrepreneurship
1
 literature offers a number of theoretical arguments to illuminate 
the early stages of ventures. It applies them to eventually explain the survival of 
ventures (e.g., Low, Macmillan 1988; Venkatraman 1997; Aldrich, Martinez 2001). 
While some consider venture survival to resemble a Darwinian evolution process 
(Hannan, Freeman 1977), others emphasize the entrepreneur's ability to adapt the 
venture strategy aiming at survival (Starr, MacMillan 1990).  
The specific context of second wave e-ventures may imply alternative factors to 
explain the survival. Therefore, this paper investigates issues relevant in the early 
stages of second wave e-ventures paying special attention to the characteristics 
common for this class of ventures.  
This paper applies case study methodology to explore the phenomenon of second 
wave e-ventures. It illustrates the development of the online video sharing community 
Clipfish and the online student community Studylounge and - drawing on the 
literature - analyzes them concerning issues relevant in early stage second wave e-
venture. It ends with a summary and several ideas how to proceed with research on 
the phenomenon.  
 
2 Research Method 
We select the fieldwork case study methodology to conduct research on the survival 
of second wave e-ventures (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1999). Fieldwork case study allows 
to reflect the complexity of reality in approaching the 'how' in the venturing process. 
According to Yin's (1999) case study typology, this paper stresses the exploratory 
character.  
For the data collection, we turned to Clipfish and Studylounge. In particular, we 
gather data concerning the overall situation and important issues from open 
discussions with three managers, a managing director, a technical director, and a 
project initiator. We conduct in-depth semi-structured interviews with the managing 
director of the online student community Studylounge and the project initiator and 
head of innovation of the online video sharing community Clipfish (Yin 1999). The 
interviews covered the overall venturing process, special events and incidents, actors 
and figures. Additional data collection efforts involved publicly available company 
and market data.  
Further we gain additional information from figures and commonly available material. 
We ground our interpretation mainly on the perception of social construction 
(Morgan, Smircich 1980) by e-venture managers.  
Ongoing data collection during the entire duration of the project assured the inclusion 
of management perspectives prior to project launch and during the early stages. The 
informal interview settings gave respondents the opportunity to be frank about their 
perceptions and impressions of the project. Reviewing results for inconsistencies and 
ambiguities and, if necessary re-checking with interviewees, reduced the risk of 
misconceptions.  
                                                 
1  Entrepreneurship concerns not only independent start-ups, but also spin-offs of established 
companies (Pinchot 1985; Starr, MacMillan 1990). 
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Admittedly, case study method involving two cases lacks some generalizability 
compared to multiple cases or quantitative cross-sectional methods. However, the 
more appropriate representation of the second wave e-venture reality weighs against 
that weakness.  
3 Two Second Wave E-Ventures 
The two case studies represent the second wave e-ventures Clipfish and Studylounge. 
Both are spin-offs, meaning entrepreneurial teams in established companies came up 
with an idea, developed the idea, and ventured in the context of the established 
company. While spin-offs are quite common in times of new business opportunities 
enabled by the Internet, second wave e-ventures also establish independently.  
 
3.1 Video Sharing Community 'Clipfish' 
In April 2006, the largest European TV broadcasting company RTL Television, a 
subsidiary of Bertelsmann, saw video sharing communities emerging, both abroad 
(e.g., youtube.com) and on its home turf, the German market (e.g., myvideo.de, 
sevenload.de). RTL Interactive (RTL), an RTL business unit, explored the 
opportunity to establish its own video sharing community.  
Reflecting on the general TV broadcasting environment it operated in and the two 
core competencies, user acquisition and revenue generation through selling access to 
viewers, RTL decided to launch an online video sharing community. It set up a 
project team consisting of two operative members, a manager and a technically 
oriented website designer and assigned an executive manager to the team to secure 
access to resources and report to the board.  
Following a short investigation of the business opportunity and the threats, the project 
adopted the name Clipfish and developed a working alpha version of the website in 
April 2006. Changing the website design twice within four weeks, Clipfish managed 
to come up with a working alpha backed by a technological infrastructure concept 
within four weeks. Upon quick load and stability testing, Clipfish launched the 
website on June 14, 2006.  
During the post-launch phase, Clipfish built on RTL's strengths and gained key 
supporters to grow the community. It observed how the word had spread since the 
community had counted a total of 120 to 180 highly active core users. First generation 
adopters uploaded content, invited friends to join the community, and engaged in 
community building activities like commenting, rating, and messaging.  
In August 2006 - a beta version had just been released - Clipfish noticed that the 
popularity of its site increased and consequently user growth and network traffic 
started to accelerate. However, Clipfish could not predict yet when user growth and 
thus network traffic volume would accelerate. Following the slogan "don't crash your 
beta", Clipfish avoided heavy marketing expenditures in order not to risk website 
performance with massive traffic in an immature beta stage.  
In late September 2006, RTL Television learned that commercial TV rival 
ProSiebenSat1 took a 30% stake in Clipfish's competitor myvideo
2
. Even though 
                                                 
2  Myvideo was the first German video sharing community. It was officially founded in April 
2006 and operates mainly from its headquarters in Romania.  
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Clipfish's website was still in beta phase, RTL decided to announce Clipfish on its 
prime time TV news.  
Literally within minutes after the announcement, Clipfish saw traffic on the website 
explode. It worked heavily on the infrastructure, which could barely cope with the 
user load. Clipfish experienced availability bottlenecks.
3
  
Following the hassle, Clipfish convinced RTL to invest in higher capacity 
infrastructure, server architecture, human resources, and marketing to further proceed 
on the successful path it had entered. Based to its initial success, Clipfish achieved 
funding for massive online advertising campaigns, TV commercials, and cross-
promotion activities with selected TV shows from its parent company RTL. For 
instance, Clipfish set up a branded portal for the German counterpart of 'Pop Idol', the 
music entertainment TV show. With the portal, it offered registered users the chance 
to upload their self-produced casting videos and provided all casting videos shortly 
after the show. Following the example, Clipfish set up further portals with exclusive 
and branded content which could neither be imitated nor copied, and thus 
strengthened the brand association with its parent company RTL.  
In markets with network effects
4
, first movers are expected to experience first mover 
advantages, which sometimes even lead the market to tip to one standard or provider 
(Lieberman, Montgomery 1998). With regard to online video sharing communities, 
user-driven video supply, video ratings, comments, and message boards indicate the 
existence of network effects. Even though Clipfish had entered the German markets as 
late mover two months after myvideo, it depicted continuously accelerating user 
growth rates. Instead of tipping to either video sharing community, the market 
allowed both online video sharing communities to co-existed.  
In February 2007, only eight months after its launch, Clipfish had become an official 
unit of RTL, it counted some 190,000 registered users, gained on average 2,800 new 
registrations per day, and received about 5,000 videos from registered users per day. 
Overall, at peak times during the day - usually between 6 and 10 o'clock p.m. - 
Clipfish observed approximately 75,000 visitors simultaneously on its website.  
 
3.2 Online Student Community 'Studylounge' 
In March 2006, Christoph Berger, co-founder and board member of Intergenia AG, 
came up with the idea to set up an online community for students in higher education. 
Based on entrepreneurial experience and with access to resources needed, Berger 
proposed the project of setting up an online community for students to the Intergenia 
board. Intergenia AG is a German Internet Holding founded during the first wave of 
e-ventures in 1999. Besides its core business of server hosting, Intergenia operates 
several content-based websites, a web agency, and an IP telephone service provider.  
In March 2006, Berger scheduled a meeting with the German Internet company I12 
AG which was founded in 1999 and specialized in publishing special interest content 
on the Internet. Berger knew the i12 CEO from industry events and had previously 
                                                 
3  Bottlenecks slowed down the speed of the website. The website did not deny service or go 
offline at any time. Fortunately, Clipfish quickly designed a scalable architecture to manage 
such and future traffic peaks.  
4  Katz and Shapiro (1985), Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) or Shankar and Bayus (2003) 
describe network effects, a phenomenon where the value of a network to a user depends on the 
number of users comprising the network. Network effects often cause the dominance of one 
network, as it initiated a tipping of the market to just one network (Shapiro, Varian 1998).  
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worked with the company on several Intergenia projects. At the end of the meeting, 
the companies decided to launch the online student community Studylounge. 
Intergenia offered hosting and marketing-based monetization of websites. I12 
contributed software developers and content management software (CMS).  
Still in March 2006, Intergenia and I12 founded the joint-venture in Germany. Only 
about a month after the kick-off meeting, in April 2006, Studylounge went live in its 
home market.  
At that time, its main competitor in the German market for student communities, 
StudiVZ, founded in October 2005, already had about 50,000 users.  
In spite of an increasing user growth rate fostered by heavy initial marketing, in 
absolute user numbers, Studylounge, achieving almost 7,000 users in 30 days, grew 
slower than StudiVZ. As a result, by mid August 2006, when about 700,000 of 
Germany's two million university students participated in one community, 90% of 
those students had chosen StudiVZ, only about 6% Studylounge, and the remaining 
4% split among ten other communities. Studylounge realized that they would need 
tremendous financial efforts to conquer the German market.  
Analyzing the interaction in both online student communities, Studylounge found that 
the main benefit for students lay in up-to-date profiles and direct and continuous user 
interaction and learned that students showed little willingness to administer redundant 
profiles in different communities. Studylounge recognized that both existing and new 
users appreciated the larger community which was StudyVZ. Studylounge was 
concerned that the market would completely tip to its competitor and therefore 
pursued the strategic shift to other lucrative countries.  
As no company had yet approached other large European markets such as France, 
Italy, or Spain to establish an online student community, Studylounge decided to 
move abroad. It focused its strategic resources initially on the Italian market, betting 
on an early mover advantage for which it had been too late in Germany. Its existing 
systems could easily be transferred to other languages, allowing for a tight launch 
schedule of less than a month.  
Only weeks after the decision, still in August '06, Studylounge launched a national 
website in Italy. Studylounge seemed to be first mover in the Italian market. To gain 
flexibility in resources, Studylounge employed local master students who represented 
the company and coordinated local activities such as the production and distribution 
of promotional material.  
To approach the Italian market, Studylounge applied several innovative marketing 
instruments, which differed from the ones it had used upon launch in the German 
market. To spread the word on campuses and student events, but also on Internet 
forums, Studylounge let members actively participate in the marketing. It equipped 
students with flyers, posters, and other materials to convince fellow students to join 
the online student community. Studylounge awarded participating students a special 
title, supposedly raising their social status within the online community.  
Further, Studylounge adapted its systems to facilitate innovative marketing Only 
hours after a user registration, Studylounge automatically sent an email signed by one 
Studylounge founder encouraging the new member to invite friends to make the 
community successful.  
In October 2006, competitor StudiVZ followed Studylounge and also launched in 
Italy. However, different from the experience in Germany, Studylounge had the lead 
and was ahead of StudiVZ by several thousands users.  
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In February 2007, Studylounge Germany had around 48,000 registered website users, 
but growth was marginal. It generated revenues on the page impressions and clicks 
through selling ad space on its website.  
While the development of the Studylounge community had halted in the German 
market in February 2007, in the same month, Studylounge strengthened its efforts in 
Italy. Studylounge.it - after a slow start - had approximately 15,000 registered users, 
about 6,000 more than StudiVZ, and counting about 250 new registrations every day. 
Core Studylounge user groups with about 15 to 25 members were established at 
several large Italian universities, e.g., Luigi Bocconi University Milano, University of 
Rome la Sapienza, and University of Perugia. Those groups actively fostered 
Studylounge's gathering of further members and contribute to the uploading of 
content such as photos and discussion entries. Studylounge expected exponential 
growth of online student communities to start at an installed base of 18,000 to 25,000 
registered users - this time for Studylounge as first mover.  
 
Table 1 summarizes both second wave e-ventures under consideration.  
 
 Clipfish Studylounge 
Business 
Online video sharing 
community 
Online student community 
Initiation Date April '06 March '06 
Launch Date June '06 April '06 
Parent Company 
RTL Interactive (RTL Group, 
Bertelsmann), Germany 
Intergenia AG, I12 AG, 
Germany 
Main Market Germany Italy 
Secondary Markets Various European countries Germany, Spain, France 
Users (Feb. '07) About 190,000 About 63,000 
Table 1. Summary of Two E-Venture Cases  
 
 
4 Discussion 
The discussion involves both cases and analyzes issues relevant in the early stages of 
second wave e-ventures. It draws on the literature for guidance.  
 
4.1 Adaptation and Securing Access to Resources 
For e-ventures, first year survival probability increases with the capability of fast 
adaptations (Paolo and Magnusson 2006). For quick adaptations, second wave e-
ventures require sufficient resources. In case they originate in established 
corporations, a certain resource dependency on their respective parent companies 
could inhibit quick adaptation. An executive manager as link between the e-venture 
and the parent company substantially facilitates fast decision making concerning the 
e-venture. It provides access to required resources from the parent company and 
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sometimes even allows for non-authorized activities by the e-venture (Noda, Bower 
1996).  
As subsidiary of RTL, Clipfish had to adhere to conservative resource allocation 
structures. In contrast to the entrepreneurship literature (Noda, Bower 1996), Clipfish 
could neither change RTL's corporate decision making structures nor could it apply 
non-authorized activities to achieve resources. Despite the volatility in the market, 
Clipfish had to show a valid business case to convince its parent company and to 
unlock the necessary resources to launch the second wave e-venture.  
Studylounge, as a joint-venture of two parent companies, experienced ambiguous and 
ambivalent resource allocation instances. In contrast to Noda and Bower (1996) but in 
line with Newbert (2005) and Zahra et al. (2006), Studylounge exploited the 
partnership among its two differently positioned founders to benefit in terms of 
complementary human and financial resources. It obtained hosting and marketing 
support from Intergenia and software development and content management input 
from I12. To both parent companies, Studylounge plausibly illustrated the business 
opportunity inherent in the right composition of the asked for resources.  
Upon resource availability, both second wave e-ventures needed to allocate them in a 
flexible and parsimonious way, taking into account community growth and frequently 
changing service requirements. Clipfish issued contracts to part-time employees. It 
made use of on-demand and outsourcing offerings to be capable of reacting to sudden 
demand changes concerning technology and technology related skills. Studylounge 
directly controlled only few resources, but made sure it could go back to Intergenia or 
I12 for further resources in due course if its business accelerated and required 
extended infrastructure. Its resource strategy allowed Studylounge to shift its strategic 
focus to further countries and quickly create the needed logical structures, e.g., 
website and database, as core assets of its second wave e-venture.  
 
4.2 Marketing Strategies With Limited Resources 
With limited initial resources and consequently scarce marketing budgets, second 
wave e-ventures build on guerilla marketing
5
 and viral marketing
6
 to reach the 
potential core community users.  
Clipfish set up forums and web portals to pursue viral marketing. Further, it designed 
an application user interface (API) that allowed users to post Clipfish branded videos 
under external domains and thus to promote the Clipfish community and its service. It 
aimed at not only creating a brand image, but directly conveying also the actual 
service offerings (Morris et al. 2002). Its traditional Internet marketing involved 
search engine marketing, cost-per-order-marketing through affiliate systems, and 
banner campaigns.  
In addition to its online marketing activities, Clipfish also applied classical marketing 
owing to its special position as subsidiary to a large media company (Bennett 1988). It 
exploited the diversified network of RTL when it took advantage of cost-effective 
cross promotion involving RTL TV shows and various RTL websites. It also 
benefited from editorial advertising such as the prime time TV announcement. 
                                                 
5  Guerilla marketing refers to "low cost, effective communications, cooperative efforts and 
networking leveraging resources, using energy and imagination" (Morris et al. 2002, 3).  
6  Viral marketing, also called user-to-user marketing stands for "the tactic of creating a process 
where interested people can market to each other" (Subramani, Rajagopalan 2003, 300).  
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Clipfish's website traffic directly followed both the announcement in prime time news 
and various TV spots.  
Studylounge pursued both, guerilla and viral marketing. It exploited active user 
participation, both on its community website and directly on campuses and at student 
events. Studylounge convinced students to promote the Studylounge community in 
their respective educational milieu. It equipped student teams with t-shirts, flyers, and 
posters to spread the word in their every day environment. As incentive, it allowed 
those student teams to take prominent positions in the community. Applying those 
innovative, yet inexpensive marketing approaches in the Italian market, Studylounge 
observed superior results in Italy compared to its previously applied more classical 
approaches in Germany.  
 
 
5 Summary and Outlook to Further Research 
This paper described the initiation and growth of two second wave e-ventures, i.e., 
newly founded companies offering community-driven services via the Internet. The 
first case illustrates the birth and growth of Clipfish, an online video sharing 
community and the second case portrays Studylounge, an online student community. 
Based on the two case studies, the paper discussed issues relevant in the early stages 
of second wave e-ventures.  
The paper found that actively securing access to resources was especially important in 
second wave e-ventures as spin-offs of established companies. Towards access to 
resources, top management involvement was similarly important for e-ventures as it 
commonly is for classic ventures. Further, a solid business case and the illustration of 
the business opportunity deliver the arguments to achieve resources from the parent 
company. Apart from securing access to resources, the paper found that a marketing 
strategy comprising viral, guerilla, and classical marketing instruments accounted for 
the scarce available resources characterizing typical second wave e-ventures and 
successfully accomplished community growth.  
Further research may investigate how those issues relevant in early stages of second 
wave e-ventures relate to factors of survival from traditional entrepreneurship 
literature. Also, one could explore the issues in ventures from different contexts. 
Assuming the issues occur similarly also in different contexts, further cases could 
serve to operationalize the issues before quantitative research could confirm them and 
test possible relationships.  
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